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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNT
STATE OF GEORGIA
MIRKO DI GIACOMANTONIO and
ROSA INC.,
Plaintiff,

v.

)
)
)

~) Civil Action File No. : 2007CV133477
)
)

SANDRO ROMAGNOLI, ET AL.,
Defendants,

~

)

-------------------------)
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
for Specific Performance, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
The parties asked the Court to rule on the briefs they filed in connection with these
motions, and so the hearing of their oral arguments scheduled for February 29,
2008, was cancelled. The Court has read the briefs submitted by the parties and
rules as follows:

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The parties were owners of a chain of five Figo restaurants in the Atlanta area
from 2002 until 2007 when the events giving rise to this law suit occurred. They
conducted their business through several interrelated limited liability corporations.
Plaintiff Mirko Di Giacomantonio generally conducted business through his
company, Plaintiff Rosa, Inc. Hereinafter the Plaintiffs will be designated as Di
Giacomantonio unless otherwise specified. Defendant Sandro Romagnoli conducted
business through his company, Defendant The Emilio Civeli Group, Inc. These
Defendants will be referred to hereafter as Romagnoli unless otherwise specified.
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Defendant Irven B. Penn conducted business through his companies, Defendants LJ
Hooker Corporation (Worldwide), Inc. and IB Penn, Ltd. These Defendants will be
designated as Penn hereinafter unless otherwise noted.
Figo Pasta, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company, was organized in 2002 to
own and operate Figo Pasta on Collier Road, the first Figo restaurant. Pursuant to the
company's operating agreement, Di Giacomantonio and Romagnoli each owned 50% of
this company. In 2003 and 2004, the operating agreement was amended, both times
granting an ownership interest but not voting rights to Penn.
In January 2003, Certo, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company ("Certo"), was
created to own and operate Osteria Del Figo restaurant on Howell Mill Road, the
second Figo restaurant. The operating agreement governing this company was
amended one year later. The operating agreement and the amendment to it specified
various percentages of ownership by the parties. Voting rights for this company were
50% for Di Giacomantonio, 50% for Romagnoli, and 0% for Penn.
Spiga, LLC, a Georgia Limited Liability Company ("Spiga"), was created in May
2003 to operate the Figo central kitchen commissary. Again, the parties had varying
percentages of ownership pursuant to the operating agreement for Spiga, and its
amendment the following year, but voting rights remained equally divided between Di
Giacomantonio and Romagnoli.
Pursuant to the terms of a loan agreement, Di Giacomantonio's interest in Certo
and Spiga was bought out by Defendants in 2004. Defendants thereafter formed three
additional LLCs to construct and own three more Figo restaurants (numbers 3, 4, and 5)
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in which Plaintiffs had no interest. There are no issues with regard to any of the
aforementioned agreements among the parties.
In early 2007, the parties entered into several new operating agreements
creating three holding companies to own all five of the Figo restaurants and the central
commissary. These agreements form the basis of this law suit, and are referred to
hereafter as the restructuring agreements. Plaintiffs contend that the restructuring
agreements are unenforceable because of Defendants' tortious actions, while
Defendants contend that they are enforceable. Defendants move the Court to order
specific performance of the restructuring agreements by the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs move
for partial summary judgment, contending that there are no issues of fact with regard to
whether an event triggering Plaintiffs' involuntary withdrawal from ownership of the Figo
entities has occurred.
Both of these motions raise the issue of whether any basis exists for the
involuntary withdrawal provision of the restructuring agreements to apply. While the
Complaint alleges fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breaches of fiduciary duty and
conspiracy, all of which if proved would void the contracts, Plaintiffs argue that, even if
the Court finds the restructuring agreements to be enforceable, no involuntary
withdrawal events occurred, and thus, Defendants had no basis to force Di
Giacomantonio's withdrawal from the enterprise.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
As all parties appear to agree, the restructuring agreements at issue in this case
were signed by the parties after a certain amount of negotiations and review. Thus, the
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restructuring agreements are enforceable, as a matter of law, unless Plaintiffs can
successfully establish a defense or challenge to the contracts.
The facts show that Di Giacomantonio had adequate time to read and review the
restructuring agreements he signed in 2007, and that he consulted his attorney before
he signed them. Therefore, the Court finds that there are no issues of fact with regard
to Di Giacomantonio's allegations that he didn't understand the restructuring contracts.
See Hovendick v. Presidential Fin. Corp .. 230 Ga. App. 502 (1998)
Di Giacomantonio also argues that he was fraudulently induced to sign the
restructuring agreements because Defendants owed him a fiduciary duty to disclose
material terms (Le., the effect of the involuntary withdrawal provisions). The party
asserting a confidential relationship bears the burden of establishing it. Parello v. Maio.
268 Ga. 852, 853 (1998). Confidential relationships can be established by
demonstrating a contractual, statutory or fiduciary duty to act in a certain manner.
Neither Section 5.4 of the restructuring agreements, nor C.C.G.A. § 14-11-305 obligates
Defendants to provide such information to Di Giacomantonio. Plaintiff, therefore, failed
to establish the existence of a confidential relationship necessary to prevail on his claim
that he was fraudulently induced to sign the restructuring agreements. See Parello v.
Maio. 268 Ga. 852 (1998); Ledford v. Smith. 274 Ga. App. 714 (2005); Hovendick v.
Presidential Fin. Corp .. 230 Ga. App. 502 (1998).
The restructuring agreements described events that, if they occurred, would force
Di Giacomantonio's involuntary withdrawal from ownership in the various holding
companies at issue. In general, these events have to do with potential claims of interest
in the Figo entities caused by the divorce of any of the owners, and certain behaviors by
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the owners. Romagnoli and Penn contend that at least one of these events has
occurred, and seek summary judgment ordering Di Giacomantonio's specific
performance of the restructuring agreements by his involuntary withdrawal from
ownership in the LLCs involved. Di Giacomantonio seeks summary judgment in his
favor as to whether any event triggering his involuntary withdrawal from the several
LLCs involved in the restructuring agreements has occurred. The heart of the parties'
dispute revolves around the meaning of the phrase "if ... a final order of a court in a
divorce proceeding ... is entered .... " (emphasis added).
Contract construction is a matter of law.
Inc., _

Glisson v. IRHA of Loganville,

S.E.2d _ , 2008 WL204624 *1 (Jan. 25, 2008).

First, a court must

determine whether the contract is clear or ambiguous. If a court finds that an
ambiguity exists, then the rules of contract construction found in D.C.G.A. §§ 132-2 and 13-2-3 are applied to resolve the ambiguity. These construction rules
include ascertaining the intent of the parties, giving words their plain meaning,
and construing the contract to uphold it in whole. D.C.G.A. §§ 13-2-2, 13-2-3. If,
after applying these rules, the ambiguity is not resolved, then the question of
interpretation is one of fact not appropriate for determination on summary
judgment. Magnetic Resonance Plus, Inc., v. Imaging Systems Internat'l, 273
Ga. 525, 526 (2001).
The Court finds that whether the involuntary withdrawal provision
language "is entered" is retrospective or prospective is an ambiguity and thus will
apply the rules of contract construction.

The language of other involuntary

withdrawal triggering provisions focus on future events with phrases such as
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"makes an assignment" and "ceases to perform."

The Court, however, is

sensitive to the need for LLC members to protect their investment by shielding
themselves from the unwanted transfer of shares and is cautious in reading a
strict temporal requirement (future actions only) into this provision.
Both Plaintiff and Defendants, however, acknowledge that the purpose of the
restructuring agreements, in part, was to grant ownership interests to Di Giacomantonio.
In addition, all of the parties were aware of the 2003 divorce settlement in question. To
interpret the provision as Defendants request would create an illogical result and render
the provisions granting Di Giacomantonio ownership interests without meaning.
Therefore, consistent with O.C.G.A. §§ 13-2-2 and 13-2-3, the Court finds thatthe
involuntary withdrawal provision is prospective and therefore not triggered by Di
Giacomantonio's 2003 divorce settlement.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for Specific Performance is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART: their Motion for the specific performance

of involuntary withdrawal is hereby DENIED; however, to the extent that they seek
summary judgment that the restructuring agreements are valid and enforceable, implicit
in the motion for specific performance, their Motion is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiffs'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED this

1"3

day of March, 2008.

41l LL-1'J.

Pov ~

ALICE D. BONNER, JUDGE
Superior Court of Fulton County
Atlanta Judicial Circuit
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Copies to:
John M. Gross, Esq.
John J. Richard, Esq.
Ramsey Knowles, Esq.
TAYLOR BUSCH SLiPAKOFF & DUMA LLP
1600 Parkwood Circle, Suite 200
Atlanta, Georgia 30339
Walter H. Bush, Esq.
Tammy A. Bouchelle, Esq.
Christopher B. Freeman, Esq.
SCHIFF HARDIN LLP
One Atlantic Center, Suite 2300
1201 West Peachtree Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30309
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